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CON T EN TS.
I. STRIKES.-Definitions - Dependency of legality or illeg-
ality of strike upon object and means of accomplish-
ing it.
II. OBJECT of STRIKES. - Strike to advance wages legal
- to induce employer to re.tain or dismiss employe
legal - to better strikers' condition, legal -to in-
duce workmen to join societies or unions, legal - to
injure anyone, illegal - malicious objedt, illegal.
III. MEANS of accomplishing the object.- Peaceable means,
as persuasion, argument etc., legal - violent means
as threats, intimidation, etc., illegal - boycotts,
illegal - picketing when peaceably conducted, legal-
riots and mob violence, illegal.
IV. REMEDIES.-
Legal:-action for enticing away employes either with
or without contract -actual injury, resulting in
damages, must be shown- mere wrongful act will not
create liability.
Equitable:- Injunction granted when no adequate
remedy at law - to save multiplicity of actions -tem-
porary injunction granted , pending argumnent- mere
illegality not sufficient to warrant an injunction
-actual or threatened interference with property
necessary - peaceable combinations or strikes not
to be enjoined - Courts of Equity have power to
punish for contempt, those who disobey their orders.
A strike is largely a growth of the present century
There are accounts of strikes in the past but as now
known , its growth has been so recent that one may almost
say within the last half century.
Two accounts of early strikes are found in 27 Am.
Law Review 708, one in 310 B.C. among the flute players
in the Temple of Jupiter, because they were not allowed
to hold their repasts in the Temple. The other occurred
in 474 A. D. for an Increase of wages. It resulted in
the passage of an ordinanc+unishing the strikers.
The legal writers and the courts agree in the main
to define a strike as "a combination among laborers or
those employed by others* to compel an inFcrease of wag-
es, a change in the hours of labor, a change in the man-
ner of conducting the business of the principal or to
enforce some particular policy in the character or num-
"ber of men employed or the like. Anderson's Law Dic-
tionary . The definition is taken from D. & H. R.R. Co.
v Bowens, 58 N.Y. 573. Windfield's Adjudged Words and
Phrases(1882) quotes the definition laid down in Farrer
v Close, 4 Q. B. 612,"A strike is a sinultaneous cessa-
"tion of work on the part of the workmen"
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Black's Law Dictionary (1891),says, "A strike is
"the act of a body of workmen, employed by the same mas-
"ter, in stopping work altogether at a prearranged time
"and refusing to continue until higher wages or shorter
"hours or some other concession is granted to them by
"the employer." Another definition , "The terr is ap-
"plied cormmonly to a combined effort on the part of a
"body of workmen employed by the same master to enforce
"a demand for higher wages, shorter hours or some other
"concession by stopping work in a body at a prearranged
"time and refusing1h resume work until the demanded con-
"cession shall have been granted", is found in the Am.
Encyclopedia of Law under "Strikes".
Bouvier's (1883) Law Dictionary says, "A strike is
"a combined effort by workmen to obtain higher wages or
"other coneessions from their employers, by stopping
"work at a prearranged time". None of these appear to
include the sympathetic strike.
Certain elements are necessary to constitute a
strike and they are (1) a combination or agreement
(2) among workmen (3) to cease work simultaneously at a
(4) prearranged time for the purpose of enforcing (5)
some demand made by the strikers of their (6) employers,
or in the case of a sympathetic strike , upon some other
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person , upon whom their force is directly brought to
bear. The strike does not occur until the employes have
actually ceased work.
But as to the legality or illegality of the strike.
In the Longshoremen's Assoc. v Howell, 38 Fac. Rep. 547,
it is said, "a strike is not illegal per se". And Mr.
Justice Harlan in Arthur v Oakes (C. C. A.) , 63 Fed. R
310, said," A combination among employes, having for
"their object the orderly withdraw&l in a body from the
tservice of their employer on account of a reduction of Xh
"their wages, is not,as a matter of law, within the mean-
"ing of that word as commonly used. Such a withdrawal,
"though amounting to a strike, is not illegal". In Ray's
Contractual Limitations, after defining a strike the
author_ says, "Its legality or illegality depends upon
"the means by which it is enforced or upoh its objects."
ceas-
It is evident from the above that the mere act of ]IBNxgg
ing work for a lggal purpose in a peaceable and lawful
manner, is, under the ordinary circumstances of a strike
legal. But first,the l :gality depends upon the object
and second, upon the mode of effecting the object.
At Common Law, any combination of laborers, whether
for an increase of wages or any other object was illeg-
al. It was irrebuttably presumed to b" done with a meal-
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icious intent and hence a conspiracy. In the earliest
reported strike case, Rex v The Journeymen Tailors, 8
Modern 10, decided in the early part of the 18th Century
the Court said, that whila. it was not an indictable of-
fense for laborers to quit work for the purpose of se8
uring a increase in their wages, yet a conspiracy or
combination to do so was indictable. The early Americ-
an cases held the same rule , among the first being
Commonwealth v Pullis which was tried in the Mayor's
Court of Philadelphialin 1806,and afterwards reported
in Wright's Law of Criminal Conspiracies. The shoemakers
combined to compel .others to quit work to enforce an
increase in wages. This was field to be an indictable of
fense.
Another Pennsylvania case , The Pittsburg Cord-
wainers Case, tried in 1815, held that a conspiracy to
coerce an employer, to prevent men from following their
trades or to compel them to join a society of workmen
was unlawful . in Commonwealth v Carlisle, Bright's Pa.
Cases, 36 , occurring in 1821, a conviction was had on o.
an indictment for conspiracy to reduce the rate of wages
of journeymen shoemakers. The Court said, " A combina-
"t ion is criminal whenever the act done or tobe dn a
"a necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to
oppress individuals by unjustly subjecting them to the
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"power of the confederates and giving the effect to the
"purpose of the latter, whether extortion or mischief."
It was a serious matter to combine for any purpose
whatever in those times for the rights of the employer
were protected at the expense of the laborerswho were
but slowing emerging from the serfdom of the prec!ding
centuries. But gradually the sky cleared and in England
by 6 Geo. IV, c. 129, an entire change was made. All
statutes prohibiting agreements for the purpose of alter-
ing wages, hours or other matters between employer and
employe, were enumerated'and absolutely repealed. The
statute confined future,, prohibitions to'endeavors by
threats, force, intimidation , molestation or obstruction
to affect wages or hours. Such means were declared
illegal but an agreement concerning wages or hours was
legal provided its means of enforcement did not violate
the above prohibition. This statute has served as a mod-
el for statutes in many of the United States.
During the time preceding the passage of the statut-
es in the United States, the Courts and legal writers
had leaned toward the 1Broader view as laid down in the
Statute of King George. In the case of the People v
Melvin, 2 Wheeler's C. C. 262, the New York Court holds
that "a combination of journeymen which attempts by
threats and fines to coercNorkmen into a wtrikl is a
"conspiracy "and as such, illegal. It also intimates that
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had peaceable means been used ,it would have been legal.
The case of the People v Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, is similar
to the above. Finally in 1870, the State of New York
adopted the first of a series of laws , following the
model of that adopted by England in the reign of George
the Fourth.
The Courts had now arrived at the conclusion that
"the orderly and peaceable assembling or oo-operation
"of persons for obtaining an advance in wages apd for
"maintaining such a rate , is not conspiracy." Pe le v
Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 409. Swe also People v
Smith, 5 do.509. Cooley on Torts at p.229, says " It was
"shown ----that the conspiracy was not of itself a legal
"wrong. It is a thing amiss when it has an unlawful
"purpose in view, but it does not become a legal wrong
"until the unlawfuilm purpose is accomplished or until
"some act distinctly illegal, is done toward its accom-
"plishment. Nor is it perceived that the end itself
"can be unlawful if it can be accomplished by perfectly
"lawful means." See also Bigelow on Torts #75-79; Clerk
and Lindsall on Torts, p 16; Brientenberger v Schmidt,
38 Ill. Ap.168.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary says, "When this (meaning
"ing the strike) is peaceably effected without any pos-
"itive breach of contract, it is not un lawful."And Chief
Justice Beardsley, of the New Jersey Court of Appealssaid
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in State v Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151,"nor is there any
"more doubt that though the purpose the confederacy is
"designed to accomplish be not criminal, yet if the means
"be of an indictable character, this offense(conspiracy)
"is likewise committed."
So a strike may be lawful if its objects are lawful
and the means by which the object is to be accomplished
are also lawful. This raises the two distinct and per-
tinent questions: What is a lawful object of a strike.
and What are lawful means of accomplishing this object
when lawfnl, for if either be illegal, the whole is
tainted.
Andfirst, what is a lawful object? Perhaps the
best method of determining this question is to ascertain
what is not lawful as an object. The common idea attach-
ing itself to the thought of a strike is that it is an
endeavor on the part of the strikers to dictate to the
employer . The wage question is a frequent cause of a
strike and the- object is to secur an advance. The first
AaeriCan case, Commonwealth v Pullis, cited above, was
founded on a strike in the city of Philadelphia for an
increase of wages and the Court held that "a combination
"to compel other shoemakers to quit work to enforce an
"increase in wages is an indictable offence " and so
unlawf ul .
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A Massachussc tts case, Commonwealth v Hunt, Thatcher
Criminal Cases 609, was of- similar origen and was decid-
ed upon the same doctrine, see also People v Fisher ,sup-
ra.
The English cases of that time of which Reg. v
Duffield, 5 Dox Crim. Cases 404, is a type, held that
"workmen had not the right to conspire to compel an in-
"crease of wages by abandoning the service of their
"master or inducing others to do so." See also Reg. v
Druitt, 10 Cox Crim. Cases 593. The dases of that time
all held that a strike or combinationo accomplish an
increase of wages was an indictable offense.
But the change was soon effected. In the English
case of Reg. v Rowlands, 17 Adol. and Ellis(N. S.) .671,
the Court in charging the jury said, "The law is clear
"that workmen have a right to combine to obtain such wag-
"es as theychoose to agree to demand. As far as I know
"there is no objection in point of law to it." On appeal,
the highest court of England said that the charge was
correct. Lord Campbell ,C. J., said, in Hilton v Eckers-
ley, 24 L. J. 353 at p. 359, "I cannot bring myself to
"believe--.--- that if two workmen who sincerely believe
" their wages to be itadequate, shall meet and agree
"that they will not work unless their wages are raised,
"without designing or contemplating violence or any il-
"legal means of gaining their object, they would be guilty
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"of a misdemeanor and liable to punishment. - - -The ob-
"ject is not illegal and therefore if no illegal means
"are to be used, there is no indictable conspiracy." The
latest English case on this subject is the Mogul Steam
ship company v McGregor, 15 Q. B. D. 477,in which Chief
Justice Coleridge lays down the rule at present applic-
able in England, thus, "A combination of workmen to ob-
"tain better wages is lawful so long as their object and
"purpose are not to injure another."
The case of the Master Stevedors' Association v
I
Walsh, 2 Daly 1, which holds that " an agreement among
"workingmeti that they will not themselves work for less
"than a stipulated price, confined in its operation to
"those who have agreed to it , is not contrary to the
"law", is typical of the later American decisions. See
Thomas v the Protective Musical Association, 121 N. Y.45
Old Dominion Steamship Co. v McKenna, 18 Abb,( N. C.) 262
and People v Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 429; Perkins v
Rogg, 28 Weekly Law Bulletin, 32; and the People v Wilzig
supra.
The proposition or rule to be deduced is that , a
combination orf strike among workmen for the purpose of
effect ing an in--hrease in their wages is legal when those
combining honestly believe the desired increase to be
just and it is not to injure some one else and when the
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meanq of accomplishing this object are legal means. In
other words, the courts do not look upon such a combina-
tion as dictating to an employer. He is left free by
such a strike to do as he pleases in regard to their
demand
Now, those cases in which the object involves the
employment or discharge of workmeng involving the right
of the employer to employ whom he may choose . The cases
upon this are all to be found within the last fifty years
One of the first, cases bearing on this point is Rex V
Ferguson and Edge, 2 Starkie Reports 489. The defendants
were charged with combining to leave their employment in
order to prevent their employer from taking apprentices.
There was a conviction and the case was appealed. Al-
though the appeal was decided on points of evidence) the
Court of King's Bench expressed no doubt as to the illeg4
al nature of the offense. Rex v Rickerdyke, 1 M. & Rob.
179 was a colliery case. Laborers threatened to strike
unless certain objectionable men were discharged. Mr.
Justice Patterson held that the workmen had no~'ight to
meet and oombine for the purpose of dictating to the
master whom he should employ and that such an act was
illegal. This decision was directly in point . Then
there is the case of the Springhead Spinning Co. v Riley
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holding that"every many had the liberty of employing or
"being employed - - and every man must respect the like
"liberty in others,
It was held in People v Smith, supra, and affirmed
in the People ex rel. Gill v Walsy, 6 N. Y. Crim. Rep.
292 , 110 N. Y. 633, that combining to procure employers
to discharg specified workmen because of their refusal to
join labor organizations of the accused, is a criminal
offense. The Supreme Court of Mlassachussetts in the
well known strike case of Walker v Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
said that the employer while he has no right to protect-
ion from competition has a right of being free from mal-
icious or wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance.
And Mr. Justice Beasley, in the New Jersey case, State v
Donaldson, cited above, says , "It is not to be denied
"that the alleged aim (to secure the discharge of some
"workmen) of this combination was unlawful. The, effort
"was to dictate to this employer, whom he should discharge
"from his employment. I cannot regard such a course of
"conduct as lawful1."
It was adjudged in the case of the State v Stewart,
59 Vt. 273, that an unlawful combination to prevent, by
violence and intimidation a certain company from retaim-
ing and taking into its employment certain workmen is an
indic:- table offense.
Mr. Cooley in his book on the Law of Torts says:"A
"society of men may lawfully unite in agreeing that they
"will not perform services for thosewho employ laborers
"not associated with them. 3ut they become wrong-doers
"the moment they interfere with the liberty of others".
He cites Carew v Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1 in support of
this, also the case of the Old Dominion Steamship Com-
pany v McKennacited above.
In these early cases, the doctrine that 'combinations
for the purpose of dictating to an employer, were unlaw-
ful' was unqualifiedly laid down by the court. But as
the cases progressed that doctrine was modified so that
in instances where there was no compulsion by any means,
a strike or combination for the purpose of inducing an
employer to change his employes is not unlawful in itself.
Sir Frederick Pollock, in his Law of Torts, page 295, says:
"It would seem to follow from the principles of the mod-
"ern cases that it cannot be an actionable conspiracy for
"two or more persons by lawfuil means, to induce another
or others to do or abstain from doing what they are not
"bound to do by law"
Another object which has been held lawful is the
betterment of the laborer's trade or condition. Judge
Gibson in the early case of Commonwealth v Carlisle, cited
above, says: "A combination to resist oppression, not
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"merely supposed but real, would be perfectly innocent."
Among the last cases upon this is Reynolds v Everts
reported finally in 144 N. Y. 189. But in the opinion at
Special Term, Justice Smith states the present situation
thus, "Irrespectivof any statuite, I think the law now
"permitvorkmen at least within a limited territory, to
"combine together and by peaceable means to seek any legl
"timate advantage in their trade." See People v Kostka,
supra; In re Wabash, 24 Fed. Rep. 217; L. Linheamer v the
United Garment Workers' Association, 77,1HUn 215, upon
this topic.
But does 'any legitimate advantage' include combin-
ations to compel workmen to join a particular society or
union, or to prevent them from following their trade or
calling? In the Pittsburg Cordwainers' case it was held
that a conspiracy to prevent men from following their
trade or to compel them to join a society of workmen, was
unlawful. The same doctrine is held in the People v Kostka.
Again in the Old Dominion Steamship Company v McKenna it
was held that "all combinations or associations designed
"to coerce workmen to become mJembers of such combinations
"or to interfere with, obstruct, etc, them in working ,etc
- are pro tanta illegal combinations and associations"
Connor v Kent(1891) L. R. 2 Q. B. 545, is an English case
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holding the same doctrine. But a recent Indiana case,
Clemitt v Watson, 42 N.E. Rep.367, holds that "a combin-
"a tion among the defendants to quit work unless the Plain-
"tiff was discharged, by reason of which he was thrown
"out of employment; or an agreement not to work with the
"Plaintiff , persuant to wlich they quit work, because the
temployer refused to discharge him, by reason of which
"the business was suspended and the Plaintiff was thrown
"out of work, is not actionable in the absence of malice."
The early cases hold that combinations or strikes
for the purpose of causing workmen to join a society or
to prevent them from working at their trade,wwre illegal
no matter how the object might be accomplished. But in
the wage questionthe Courts have come to the conclusion
that if the means used to accomplish the object are legal,
the object itself is not unlawful. Thus it had been seen
that workmen may combine and strike for the purpose of
procuring an advance in thrate of wages, or to better
their condition in any way; they may leave their work un-
til a certaiti party is discharged or to induce certain
workme~n to join certain societies or unions, provided
always that the means used to accomplish such objects
are not of themselves unlawfutl.
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But they may not strike maliciously for the purpose
of injuring their employer or any other person for such
a combination or striie would have for its object the viol
ation of some other persons rights and liberties which
in the United States are reserved to them by the Constit-
utional provisions.
Now, what are the lawful means? The common methods
if traced in their growth wil be found judicially deter-
mined . within the last half century. It was held in
Reg. v Duffield, supra, that "workmen had not the right
"to compel---------.by abandoning the service of their
"master or by inducing others to quit." That case illus-
law
trates how careful of the employers rights theAat first,
was. The case of Reg. v. Druitt coming a few years lat-
er laid down a somewhat less severe rule, that "combina-
"tions of men to coerce that liberty by compulsion and
"restraint is a criminal offense."
Turning to the Amnerican cases, the Master Stevedors'
Association v alsli, decided in 1867, that a strike to
raise wages, which is legal in itself, "ai are
"into effect by threats or acts of violence, amount to a
"criminal conspiracy." Two years later in the State v
Donaldson, it was held that where a body of workmen in-
formed their employer that they would leave his factory
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if a certain workman is not dismissed, " coercion is there
"in that they agree to leave simultaneously in large
"numbers and by a preconcerted action. It is equivalent
"to a threat thatlunless he yields to their unjust demands
"they will derange his busiess." Here the mere act of
quitting their employment in a body, is considered a co-
ercion.
Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering an oral opinion
in the United States v Kane, 23 Fed. Rep. 748, said,"The
"employes am-.. may abandon the employment and by per-
suasion and argument induce oter employes to do the same;
"but if they resort to threats or violence to induce the
"others to leave or accomplish the'tr purpose without ac-
"tual violence by overawing the others by preconcerted
"demonstrations of" force - - - they may be punished for
"their unlawful acts." Herefor the first.,is the right
of the striker to use argument and persuasion to induce
other strikers to leav, recognized. But again in the
former case threats violen6*e or even intimidation are
expressly prohibited and in the lat~sr, the prohibition
is implied. Even demonstrations of force for the purpose
of intimidation may not be used.
In 1887, the Old Dominion Steamship Company v McKenna
is authoritylifor the statement that all combinations
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designed to coerce workmen to become members of such com-
bination or to interfere with, obstruct etc. them in work-
ing etc., to prevent employers from conducting thor busi-
ness , or to interfere with the perfect freedom of the
employers etc., by threats or injury or loss, by interfer-
ing with their-.business etc., are illegal combinations
and all acts done in furtherance of such intention by
by such means and accompanied by damages are actionable.
Again "while the law permits striking workmen to
"persuade and induce other workmen to cease labor and
join the strikers in their demand for higher wages, such
"strikers have no right to interfere by threats , intimid-
"ation or coercion with the free will of such other work
"man." Perkins v Rogg, supra. Cooley on Torts at p.331
says, "Acts done in persuance of a conspiracy may be un-
"lawfulin themselves if they include deception, intimida-
"tion , threats or any species of duress whatever when
"employed upon laborer or employer."
The last great strike cas decided in New York state
was Reynolds v Everts and in the opinion at Special Term
17 N. Y. Sup. 264, Justice Smith~after recognizing the
illegality of the interference of strikers by threats, in-
timidation or coercion of any kind with the free will of
the workmen and) also, recognizing the right to strike for
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certain objects, says,"The right to combine involves of
"necessity the right to persuade all o-laborers to join
"the combination. This right to persuade co-laborers in-
"volves the right to persuade new laborers to join the
"combination. This is but a corollary of the right -of
"combihation. Butwhenever the strikers assume towardhe
"employes~an attitude of menace, then persuasion and en-
"treaty with wordsowever smooth , may constitutet-intimid-
"ation which will render thos--e who use them liable to
"the penalties both of civil and criminal law."
Thus, in the beginning of the. law of strikes, a strike
or combination was illegal, indictable under any circumn-
stances. But Igradually the courts sifted the cases, plac-
ing those conducted by persuasion and argument within the
pale of the law nd leaving those conducted by threats,
violence, intimidation and coercion outside,. But this
was not reached all in a moment or without a dissenting
voice. At least one case is cited above-in which it was
held that, "leaving the employment in a body" was in it
self intinmidation and coercion. This view~ however1 as >)
but that o~the minority and to-day a quiet, orderly strike
whose members use only persuasion, argument and other
peaceable m eans to attain their object, is perfectly legal
and may be carried on with impunity, so long as their ob-
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ject is itself legal.
But now arises the question as to what constitutes
intimidation or coercion. There are certain acts which
frequently, if not always,accompany strikes. They are
boycotts, picketing and riots or mob violence.
The very idea of a boycotti.e.to prevent a person
from carrying on his business, is illegal for on the face
,it is the intention to injure the person against whom
it is declared. It is a threat carried into execution.
a threat to ruin, A's businessunless he concedes to the
demands made upon him and "a threat must be an intimida-
"tion made with the intention of forcing and unduly influen-
"cing the person's conduct against whom it is addressed."
Wood v Bowron, L. R. 2 Q.B. 21. And it was held that the
sending of notices of a strike to be continued until the
dismissal of a non-union vran, was the sending of threats
and so illegal. Skinner v Kitch, L.R., 2 Q.B. 393. also
Springhead Spinning Co. v Riley, 6 Eq. Cases 851.
In an attempt to extort mosey from a party by means
of a boycott.,it was held that intimidation did not necess-
arily require physical violence. But that the attitude
and numberi of the strikers, placards or other devices
used~migh~t constitute intimidation. People v Wilzig supua.
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Thisi- case intimates that the boycott itself would constit-
ute intimidation and thus be illegal.
A distinction between a strike and a boycott Is drawn
in Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan R.R. v the Penn-
sylvania R.R., 54 Fed. Rep. at p. 738, where it was held
that "the one combination was lawful because it was for the
"lawful purpose of selling the labor of those engaged in it
"for the highest price attainable End for the best terms.
"What the employes threatened to do,,was to deprive the
"defendant companies of the benefit accruing from their
"labor in order to induce, procure and compel the companies
"and their managing officers to consent to a criminalnd
"unlawful injury to the complainant. Neither law nor morals
"can give this right to the laborer or withhold it from
"the others forv.such a purpose." See also Sherry v Perkins
147 Mass. 212. So the boycott is of itself illegal and
as such may not be used as a means of attaining the object
of the strike.
"Picketing is another mode of intimidation resorted to
"at times and it consists of posting rilerbers of the strikers
"organization at the approaches to the works of the em
"ployer who thereupoh attempt to warn off the workmen by
fpersuasion or intimidaton. Ti a rnyntb n
"lawful accordin~to the degree of intimidation used. If
20
"persuasion alone is resorted to there is no breach of
"of the law." American Encyclopedia of Law V 24, p 132.
In Reg. v Druitt, it was held that mere picketing
if so done as not to excite unreasonable alarm, or as not
to coerce or annoy, was no offense in the law. But if
pickets indulged in abusive language or alarming gestures,
to becomes at once illegal. Other English cases holding
the same doctrine are Reg. v Shcpherd, 11 Cox Crim. C.325;
Reg. v Duffield, supra; Reg. Bauld, 13 Cox Crim, C. 282.
In the United States, the Courts have differed con-
siderably over the legality of picketing. The early cases
of People v Kostka, supra; People v Wilzig, do., Crump v
Commonwealth, 85 Va. 927; and Brace v Evans, 3 Ry. and
Corp. Law Journal held it unlawful. But this sweeping
rule has from tim to time been modified until it was laid
down by Mr. Justice Smith in Reynolds v Everts at Special
Term and not contradicted by the upper Courts when appealed
that so long a--s pickets were peaceablelin bearing and lang-
uage toward the employes, and their numbers were not suf-
ficient to be an intimidation, picketing is lawful. But
the moment that force, violence etc., are introduced, it
eases to be lawful. See also United States v Kane, supra;
Perkins V Rogg, supra; Richter v the Journeymen Tailors,
24 Weekly Law Bulletin,189.
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But in carrying out this picket duty, "No man has a
"right to enter the premisis of another for the purpose
"of inducing persons in the employment of that person to
"leave their employment." Webber v Barry, 38 N.W. Rep.289.
They mayhoweve offer money to pay the return fare or the
II
expenses of those who have taken their places, as an in-
ducement to them to join thelstrik:e. Reynolds v Everts,
supra.
The last of the accompaniments of the strike is the
riot or mob violence, which is defined as, "Where thre~or
"more persons actually do an unlawful actIof violence with
"or without common cause." 4 Bi. Com. 146. The same defin-
ition is laid down in the case of Whitley v the State, 66
Ga. 656.' Another definition is "a tumultuous disturbance
"of the peace by three or more persons assembling together
"of their own authoritIith an intent, mutually to assist
"the other against any one who shall oppose them in the
"execution of some enterprise of a private nature and af-
"terwards actually executing the same in a violent and
"turbulent manner, whether the act itself was illega1or
"not when intended." State v Russell, 45 N. H. 84.
Th -  definitions show at once the unlawful character
of the acts and it is apparently needless to cite casos
upon this point.
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From the foregoing pages it will be seen that workmen
may combine and even strike for the purpose of bettering
their condition in any way. They may do so to obtain an
advance in their wages or if a co-employe is objection
able and the employer refuses to discharge him, they may
agree to and actually quit their employment until such
objectionable person is discharged. In short the cases
now tend to hold that workmen may combine and strike dor
any object, so long as that object is not to injure some
other person and the strike is not accompanied by 4ialice.
It has also been shown that peaceable means such as
argument, persuasion and entreaty are legitimate methods
of accomplishing the desired ends; but that threats or
intimidationthough no actual violence has been used, is
considered a means of unlawful coercion, as bad ih the ey--
of the law as actual force or violence; that picketing
as a means of carrying on a strike may be lawful so long
as the demeanor of the picket is quit and peaceable and the
pickets are not in such numbers as to awe the emPloyelor
employesnto acquiescing; that boycotts and riots are
unlawful in thernselves.
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And it now remains to learn what remedies the employers
have, if any , against the strikers and the development of
them. These remedies are of two kinds, legal and equitable
and will be considered in that order.
The remedy at law isof course)in damages. In Bige-
law on Torts it is laid down tiiat, "when conspiracy is
"made the ground of a civil action, it must have caused
"damages". So it is plain that th mere strike without
damages,offers the employer or the person against whom it
was directed no remedyiiat law. The majority of actions at
law which are the outcome of strikes, have been founded
upon the enticing or driving away of servants or upon
injury.) resulting from interference with employes or the
general business.
One of the English cases decided on this remedy is
Hart v Aldridge, ICowper 54, in 1774. It was an action
for trespass for enticing away some of the plaintiff's
servants, who were employed to work by the piece. The
Court said here, "It is clear that a master may maintain
"an action for taking and enticing away his servants."
Again where the facts were similar, the court held that
the act of enticing awe y workmen, c ven though not working
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under contract, constituted conspiracy and the defendant
was liable in damages for such act. Guntor v Astor, 4
Moore(Eng.) 12; Reg. v Rowlands, supra. The Court of the
Queen's Bench, in Bowen v Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, sustained
this doctrine of Luinley v Gye, 22 L. J.( Q. D.) 463, hold-
ing that it was actionable to induce a party to break his
contract of service with the plaintiff.
The Mogul. Steamship Co. v McGregor, 23 Q. B. D. 600
is another and a later case upon this subj-ct. Lord Esher
in his opinion said, "When an indictable conspiracy is
"carried into execution by the conspirators by means of an
"unlawftld act or acts, which produce private injury to some
"person, that person has a cause of action against the
"conspirators." Here is found the broad rule that conspir-
ators or strikers, whoby means of unlawful actscause in-
jury with damage to some person, are liable to such person
for such damages. Any act of the strikers which causes
damage, will be a sufficient ground or an action by the
damaged party.
The last of the series of leading English cases @n
this practica93affirmed the rule just citedfand specific-
ally affirmed the liability for enticing away of servants
whether under contract or not. It further said that the
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"right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of con-
"tract is nOt confined to contracts in the nature of con-
"tracts for personal service. Templeton v Russell, (C.A.
1893) 1 Q. B. 71b.
But to return to the doctrine in the United States.
The early American cases were of a criminal natursand it
was not until the middle of this century that civil actn
ions were made use of against strihers. In Curran v Galen,
22 N.Y. Sup. 826, it was held that a complaint which charged
the defendant,who fepresented certain labor organizations,
with conspiracies to injure the plaintiff, in his business
and character and to prevent his obtaining employment, etc
stated a good cause of action.
A Georgia Court held that when parties knowing of
the existence of a contract of labor, entices, hires or
persuade.the laborer so contracted to leave the employment
of his first employer during the time for which he is so
employed, the law gives the party .so injured a right of
action to recover danages. Jones v Blocker 43 Ga. 331;
Also Salter v Howard, do. 601. It will alamo be seen that
this case narrows the rule of liability for enticing away
servants to cases where the person so enticing, knows of
the contract. In the same year, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Ivassachussetts, in Cronin v Walker, supra.,iaid
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down the samie rule as that by the Georgia Court and said
further,that,"the damage from which the, recovery is had
"is not loss of value of actual contract by reason of
"their non-fulfillment but the loss of advantage , which
"but for such interference, the plaintiff would have been
"able to acquire."
The case of Haskins v Royster, 70 N. C. 601, holds
the sa,_ e rule concerning the enticing away of servants.
However this court did not insist, as in 107 Mass., upon
allegatidn and proof of actual loss occasioned by such act.
The mere act of enticing away the servants ,was sufficient
to render the liability. Bixby v Dunlop, 56 N. H. 456,
though not a strike case, cites the above and holds with
Haskins v Royster. While some of the cases cited above
are against single individuals for enticing away servants,
they apply as wdll where the enticing is by the strikers.
And now the mere enticing away of servants or employes
without allegation and proof of actual damage, will not
constitute a cause of action.
The great case of this period was the Old Dominion
Steamship Company v MoKenna, supra, in which it was held
that all acts done in furtherance of such"intention4.e.
"to coerce employes to join societies,, inte! ferQ with
"business etc., and accompanied by damage are actionable."
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Here again damagc is made the essential element of the
actionability of an act. "The gist of such an action must
"not be in the combination or conspiracy but in the actual
"loss occasioned thereby." Toeldo, Anr Arbor and Northern
Michigan R. R. v Pennsylvania R.R. There the Court
tersely puts the rule which Mr. Bishop, in his work on
Non-Contract Law, lays down thus, "The rule in civil juris-
"prudence is that one cannot maintain a suit for another's
"wrongs, until he bas been injured thereby ---. No wrong-
"ful combination is actionable until the party complain-
"ing has suffered darage. In an action at law 'therefere he
"material thing is to show an injury." That is a statement
of the rule as it is today.
But the remedies most sought against the strikers are
those afforded by Equity. And , first, the interlocutory
or temporary injunction. When an application is made to,-
the Court for an injunction, if it is shown that the injury
will accrue to the applicant before the argument can be
made for the permanent injunction, the Courts will grant
what is known as a temporary injunction, pending the the
disposition of a motion ~fr a permanent injunction. This
is granted upon affidavits and is seldoni refused. See High
on Injunct ions.
It is a rule of Equity that its courts will not inter-
fere when there is a complete and adequate remedy at law.
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Or where there is no imminent danger or irreparable mis-
chief before the tardiness of the law can reach it. City
of Georgetown v Alex. Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91; Mogul Steam
ship Co. v McGregor, supra.In Blendell Bros. v Hogan, 54
Fed. Rep. 40, the Court held that the jurisdiction oqthe
Fe tal Circuit court to entertain a suit t6 enjoin a com-
bination of persons from interfering with or preventing
ship owners from shipping a crew may be maintained on
the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of actions and be-
cause damages at commo) law would be inadequate and hard
to ascertain. Where ,"the injury will e irreparable
"and a judgment at Law will be wholly inadequate, the auth-
it
orities leave no doubt that in such a case, an injunction
i
will be granted against a stranger who thus intermeddles
"and harrqsses the complainant's business." T. A.A. & N.M
R.R. v Pa. R.R., supra;Sherry v Perkins, do.; Springhead
Spinning Co. v Riley, do.; Casey v Typographical Union,
45 Fed. Rep. 135.
But the mere fact ti-at the act or acts sought to be
enjoined are illegal will not be sufficient ground for a
court of Equity to interfere. "Something more than the
"threatened cofluission of ai~ffense against the laws of
"the land is necessary to call into exercise the injunc -
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"tive powers of the Court. There must be some interference
"%ctual or threatened with property or rights of a pec-
ii
"uniary nature. United States v Debs, 158 U. S. at 593.
Arthur v Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 10; C. B. & Q. v B. C.R. & N
34 Fed. Rep. 481; Sherry v perkins, :;upra. Nor is this
injunction destroyed because the act enjoined are violations
of the criminal law. U. S. v Debs. do. Cranford v Tyr-
rell 128 N. Y. 341; Mobile v L. & N. R.R. 84 Ala. 115.
However, "wheAthere is a willful and -nlawful invasion
"of the plaintiff's rights, against his protest and re-
"monstrance, the injury being a continuing one, a manda-
"tory injunction may issue in the first instance." High
on Injunctions, -2. An injury must be shown to the
court, recrring and without remedy at law, before an
injunction will be granted.
But the Court in Reynolds v Everts refused to make
permanent an interlocutory injunction, "to- restrain handi-w
"craftsmen from combining peaceably and without intimida-
"tion, Persuadinithoir fellow workmen to leave the ser-
"vice of their employer in order to compel an advance in
"wages'.' See also Johnson Harvester Co. v Meinhardt, 60 How.
Prac. 168; lMaher v Journeymen Stone cutters' Association
47 N. J. Eq. 519. And when Reynolds v Everts was carried
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to the Court of Appeals, (144 ".Y. l8c+), Judge Gray said
"the mere apprehension of some future acts of a wrongful
"nature, which might be injurious to the plaintiff, was
"not a sufficient basis for insisting uppon a preventative
"injunction. Such a remedy becomes a necessity only when
"it is perfectly clear upon the facts, that unless granted
"the comiplainant will;, be irreparably injured and that he
"can have no adequate remiedy at law for the mischief oc-
"casioned."
But the acts sought to be enjoined in the case cited
above were peaceable and for a lawful object. Where per-
sons attempt by threats and other unlawful means , to carry
out an unlawful object, the State of IL[issouri, by its
highest court enjoined them. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v
Saxey, 32 S'W. Rep. 1106.
And, finallyIit is seen that Equity is the last re-
sort of the injured party when law cannot redress his
wrongs or where it will be a great burden for him to adopt
the legal remedy, because of the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the damages or because of the multiplicity of actions
which must result from such mode of redress. Thth
Court of Equity, upon sufficient affidavits will grant a
preliminary injunction, pending the hearing of the applie-
Ation for a permanent injunction, is well known . But then
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comes the question as to when the temporary injunction will
be made permanent. The cases hold the doctrine that Equity
will not interfere with the peaceable acts of strikers.
Nor will it,1interfere sim,]ply because the acts of the strik-
ers are unlawful. The acts must threaten or actually in-
terfere with some pecuniary interest of the party , so
that injury is certain or imminent and such injury must be
beyond the remedy of the law in any way, or else the legal
remedy must be inadequate. But when these conditions have
beenAftulfilled, Equity is ready to stretch forth her pro-
tecting arm.
And should those against whom the injunction is direct-
ed, neglect to obey it, they become guilty of contempt and
liable to punishment by the Court. Mr. Justice Brewer,
in the United States v Debs, says " But the power of the
"Court to make an order carries with it , the equal power
"to punish for the disobedience of that order and the in-
"quiry as to the question of disobedience, has been from
"time immemorial , the special function of the Court."
Case of Yates, 4 Johns. 314; Watson, v Willia2]s, 33
bliss. 331; Cartwright's case, 114 Mass. 230; U. S. v HIud-
son, 7 Cranch 32; Anderson v Dunn, 6 VWheateon; 204; Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wal. 505; Mugler v Kansas, 123 U.S. 623;
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co. 134 U.S. 31;
32.
In brief, a court nnforcing obedience to its own or-
ders by proceedings in contempt is not executing the crima-
inal laws of thn land but only securing to suitors the
rights to which, it has adjudged them entitled.
And so the Law of strikes, relating to the rights of
the strilers and the remedies of their employers, have been
brought down to the present time, the purpose of the thesis
be ing to trace out why the law is as it is but How itlcame%1
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